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The pro-cyclicality of capital ratios and credit supply, a tale of two sizes

in Banking
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Mahmoud Fatouh

Small banks are likely to have extra specialised enterprise fashions, doubtless specializing in business and retail banking actions, and present restricted interconnectedness to different monetary establishments. Therefore, they’re prone to present much less intense cyclical patterns in comparison with giant banks. This publish investigates whether or not giant and small banks within the UK and US differ within the cyclical patterns of capital positions and credit score provision.

Introduction

Following the World Monetary Disaster, the Basel III reforms launched stricter capital necessities and bolstered them with cyclical parts (the capital conservation buffer and the countercyclical capital buffer). The reforms aimed to make sure that banks have enough capital assets to soak up losses and cut back the cyclical results of financial institution capital (and regulation) on the availability of financial institution credit score in stress. The stricter and extra cycle-sensitive capital necessities ought to cut back the pro-cyclicality of financial institution capital positions as they discourage unsustainable credit score development in credit score booms, and so restrict the necessity for deleveraging in stress.

Underneath Basel III reforms, systematically vital banks face stricter necessities. Small banks largely face regulatory necessities like these of bigger banks however profit from some exemptions that differ in scope between jurisdictions. Moreover, regulators in numerous jurisdictions have been making an attempt to create less complicated (however not weaker) regulatory frameworks for small banks. Ideally, a framework for smaller banks would think about their less complicated and specialised enterprise fashions, the restricted monetary stability implications of their failure, and the disproportional compliance prices they face in comparison with bigger banks. For instance, the Financial institution of England is designing a ‘sturdy and easy’ regulatory regime for small banks with less complicated enterprise fashions.

Owing to less complicated enterprise mannequin and weaker interconnectedness, small banks needs to be much less delicate to cyclical fluctuations insofar as their credit score provide and capital positions needs to be much less pro-cyclical than bigger banks. On this publish, I examine this speculation and examine the implications of stricter cycle-sensitive capital necessities underneath Basel III for these cyclical patterns.

The info

I take advantage of bank-level knowledge and GDP development for the UK and the US. UK bank-level knowledge comes from a confidential knowledge set on the Financial institution of England and contains monetary knowledge on UK banks between 1990 and 2021. The info for US banks runs from 1979 to 2021 and was collected from a number of sources together with Refinitiv® Eikon, Capital IQ®, and revealed monetary statements. GDP knowledge was collected from the Workplace for Nationwide Statistics and FRED® for the UK and US respectively. Desk A contains abstract statistics of the bank-level and GDP development knowledge. The goal of getting a very long time sequence is to have a pattern that covers no less than a giant portion of a credit score cycle earlier than the introduction of the a lot stricter capital necessities by Basel III requirements in 2010. Stricter requirements would doubtless have an effect on the cyclical patterns of financial institution credit score and capital positions, probably decreasing the validity of outcomes. Though capital requirements existed earlier than 2010, they had been considerably weaker. Such time sequence can be utilized to reply two questions. First, analysing years as much as 2009 can be utilized to measure the cyclical patterns in a much less regulated surroundings, offering proof on whether or not Basel III wanted cyclical parts. Second, increasing the evaluation past 2009 offers proof on whether or not Basel III addressed the pro-cyclicality of financial institution capital and lending.

Desk A: Abstract statistics

1: UK knowledge (£ hundreds of thousands)

 Obs.MeanStd. Dev.MinMaxGDP growth88050.33percent2.70%-21.00percent16.60percentTotal assets876221447.72120595.9001694721.00Cash87621413.308942.130172085.00Debt securities87621790.3911886.200181717.90Total loans876210279.9348548.900704557.30Core fairness Tier 1 capital8761702.033225.36040519.10Total liabilities876220511.20114370.0001694721.00Risk-weighted assets87675987.3127755.870351969.60Non-performing loans8801160.83878.86015808.91Fixed assets876259.04224.3602369.83Deposits876212618.1658899.330844488.30Impairment charges879927.81183.24-165.545629.17Pre-tax profits830529.76274.89-4430.1410562.96Total off stability sheet commitments87624077.3623359.220280609.30Leverage ratio publicity measure159034754.35130993.5001158652.00Operating expenses83011.174.120153.36Deposits from banks87622230.7111145.690171070.40

Supply: Financial institution of England inside database.

2: US knowledge (US$ hundreds of thousands)

 Obs.MeanStd. Dev.MinMaxGDP growth13937390.66percent0.74%-2.18percent2.28percentTotal assets13937391035.352170002690000Cash138826106.95722786.6510508000Debt securities1355024173.44774106.3540470000Trading assets11226073.40333098.6210380000Total loans1393418523.03521010001030000Deposits1339080452.46111890001580000Total liabilities1388215899.35841920002450000Equity133483799.463782288.1930257000Reverse repo139249949.898631932.2820321000Subordinated debt13268188.075956265.6903029200

Sources: Refinitiv Eikon, S&P Capital IQ and revealed monetary statements.

Empirical technique

With a purpose to measure the cyclicality patterns of capital ratios and complete lending of banks and examine whether or not they differ between small and huge banks, I first categorise banks by dimension. For the UK, I take advantage of inside Financial institution of England classification of small and huge banks. In the meantime, for US banks, I outline small and huge banks as these within the lowest 80% and the very best 5% of property distribution, respectively.

Following Fatouh and Giansante (2023), I measure cyclicality of a variable by the correlation between that variable and GDP development. I estimate this correlation utilizing the next panel regression:

Y_{i,t}=beta _{i}+theta X_{i,t}+delta GDP_{t}+nu _{i,t} (1)

the place, βi: financial institution mounted impact; Yi,t, capital ratio (fairness to complete property) or log of complete lending of financial institution i at time t; Xi,t, a set of bank-level controls, together with complete property, capitalisation, and ratios reflecting enterprise mannequin (eg, loans to asset and deposits to liabilities); GDPt, GDP development charge at time t.

Evaluation

I apply the mannequin in Equation 1 to small and huge banks individually on the bank-level to detect variations within the cyclical behaviour of capital ratios and complete lending. The outcomes of the regressions are offered in Desk B.

Because the desk exhibits, capital ratios of enormous banks had been positively correlated with GDP development within the UK and US earlier than the introduction of Basel III in 2010. On common, a 1 share level fall in GDP development was related to an 80 foundation factors and 61 foundation factors drop in capital ratios of enormous banks within the UK and US, respectively. In the meantime, capital ratios of small banks had been both not correlated (UK) or negatively correlated (US) with GDP development.

Complete lending of enormous banks was pro-cyclical pre-Basel III, particularly within the UK. On common, a 1 share level fall in GDP development was related to a 302 foundation factors and 71 foundation factors fall in complete lending of enormous banks within the UK and US, respectively. The overall lending of small UK banks didn’t present cyclical patterns. Nevertheless, the whole lending of small US banks was pro-cyclical, however considerably lower than that of enormous banks (11 foundation factors in comparison with 71 foundation factors for every 1 share level change in GDP development).

Desk B: Regression outcomes for financial institution capital ratios and complete lending

1: UK banks (1990–2009)

Variables Capital ratioTotal lending Giant banksSmall banksLarge banksSmall banks (1)(2)(1)(2)GDP growth0.799***-0.005763.018***-0.621 (0.185)(0.0105)(1.032)(1.693)     No. Obs.1195511955R-squared0.9910.9950.9990.998ControlsYESYESYESYESBank FEsYESYESYESYES

Notes: Coefficient estimates of quarterly capital ratios and complete lending of UK banks between 1990 and 2009. Capital ratio is the same as fairness to complete property, and complete lending is the log of internet lending. Small and huge banks are outlined based mostly on inside Financial institution of England classifications. Commonplace errors reported between parentheses, * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.

2: US banks (1979–2009)

Variables Capital ratioTotal lending Giant banksSmall banksLarge banksSmall banks (1)(2)(1)(2)GDP growth0.612***-0.0720***0.710***0.112*** (0.133)(0.00550)(0.212)(0.0271)     No. Obs.40,116702,55440,099697,879R-squared0.8870.9050.9890.986ControlsYESYESYESYESBank FEsYESYESYESYES

Notes: Coefficient estimates of quarterly capital ratios and complete lending of US banks between 1979 and 2009. Capital ratio is the same as fairness to complete property, and complete lending is the log of internet lending. Small and huge banks are these within the lowest 80% and the very best 5% of property distribution, respectively. To make sure robustness of the outcomes, I additionally run regressions based mostly on totally different thresholds. Outcomes of the extra regressions are in keeping with the baseline outcomes. Commonplace errors reported between parentheses, * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.

In different phrases, the capital positions of enormous banks had been extra delicate to financial fluctuations than small banks in each the UK and US previous to Basel III. These traits in capital positions have an effect on the credit score provide of banks, relying on their dimension. Giant banks turn into comparatively capital-constrained in downturns, and therefore are likely to ration lending. The decrease cyclicality of small banks’ capital positions permits them to maintain their provide of credit score steadier over the cycle. Nonetheless, as giant banks present most of financial institution credit score, combination credit score crunches are anticipated, particularly in deep downturns.

Stricter capital necessities and cyclical parts (the capital conservation buffer and the countercyclical buffer) launched by Basel III ought to cut back the pro-cyclicality of enormous banks’ capital positions and provide credit score. To analyze this, I re-run the regressions above utilizing knowledge units that stretch past 2009. As Desk C exhibits, the coefficient on GDP development for giant banks falls from 80 foundation factors to 43 foundation factors (at a decrease significance stage) for UK banks, and from 61 foundation factors to 29 foundation factors for US banks. Outcomes for small banks’ capital ratios utilizing the prolonged pattern are in keeping with the baseline in Desk B.

Submit Basel III, the pro-cyclicality of complete lending of enormous banks fell from 301 foundation factors to 165 foundation factors for giant UK banks and 71 foundation factors to 49 foundation factors for giant US banks. The professional-cyclicality of complete lending of small US banks fell additional (11 foundation factors to five foundation factors) and remained properly under that of enormous banks.

Desk C: Regression outcomes for financial institution capital ratios and complete lending; Basel III impression

1: UK banks (1990–2021)

Variables Capital ratioTotal lending Giant banksSmall banksLarge banksSmall banks (1)(2)(1)(2)GDP growth0.429**-0.01921.645**0.00869 (0.204)(0.0157)(0.712)(1.642)     No. Obs.347326330304R-squared0.9850.9680.9980.988ControlsYESYESYESYESBank FEsYESYESYESYES

Notes: Coefficient estimates of quarterly capital ratios and complete lending of UK banks between 1990 and 2009. Capital ratio is the same as fairness to complete property, and complete lending is the log of internet lending. Small and huge banks are outlined based mostly on inside Financial institution of England classifications. Commonplace errors reported between parentheses, * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.

2: US banks (1979–2020)

Variables Capital ratioTotal lending Giant banksSmall banksLarge banksSmall banks (1)(2)(1)(2)GDP growth0.291***-0.0829***0.493***0.0530** (0.0607)(0.00503)(0.145)(0.0247)     No. Obs.45,900860,34745,859852,062R-squared0.9070.9240.9900.989ControlsYESYESYESYESBank FEsYESYESYESYES

Notes: Coefficient estimates of quarterly capital ratios and complete lending of US banks between 1979 and 2009. Capital ratio is the same as fairness to complete property, and complete lending is the log of internet lending. Small and huge banks are these within the lowest 80% and the very best 5% of property distribution, respectively. To make sure robustness of the outcomes, I additionally run regressions based mostly on totally different thresholds. Outcomes of the extra regressions are in keeping with the baseline outcomes. Commonplace errors reported between parentheses, * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.

In abstract, the capital positions and credit score provide had been clearly extra pro-cyclical for giant banks than small banks. The introduction of extra cycle-sensitive capital necessities underneath Basel III diminished variations between the 2 teams of banks. As such, it may be argued that the cycle-sensitive parts of capital necessities are simpler in decreasing the pro-cyclicality of credit score provide of enormous banks (than small banks), as properly the combination provide of financial institution credit score, decreasing the severity of credit score crunches in deep downturns.

Abstract

This publish assesses whether or not small banks’ complete lending and capital ratios present totally different cyclical patterns from bigger banks, and whether or not the introduction of stricter cycle-sensitive capital necessities underneath Basel III impacts these cyclical patterns. The evaluation makes use of knowledge for small and huge banks within the UK and US. The empirical outcomes recommend that previous to Basel III reforms, capital positions and credit score provide of enormous banks had been way more pro-cyclical than small banks. The introduction of extra cycle-sensitive capital necessities underneath Basel III diminished capital and credit score provide pro-cyclicality for giant banks, whereas having smaller results for small banks. This means that the cycle-sensitive capital necessities are simpler in decreasing the pro-cyclicality of credit score provide of enormous banks and decreasing severity of credit score crunch in deep downturns.

Mahmoud Fatouh works within the Financial institution’s Prudential Framework Division.

If you wish to get in contact, please e-mail us at [email protected] or depart a remark under.

Feedback will solely seem as soon as authorized by a moderator, and are solely revealed the place a full identify is provided. Financial institution Underground is a weblog for Financial institution of England employees to share views that problem – or assist – prevailing coverage orthodoxies. The views expressed listed below are these of the authors, and will not be essentially these of the Financial institution of England, or its coverage committees.

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